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Abstract
Generativity—showing concern to establish and guide future generations—has been argued to be a biological adaptation 
central to cumulative culture and survival, but also, in turn, to be a cultural adaptation dependent on norms. From the perspec-
tive of human agency, concern for the future has played a key role in raising agency for generations that follow by creating 
infrastructure and cultural inheritance. Here, in a population-representative sample of 756 twin-pairs, we present the first 
test of the genetic and environmental structure of generativity using the Loyola Generativity Scale (short). Genetic analysis 
of scale sum-scores revealed that shared environmental effects were comparable in magnitude or exceeded effects estimated 
for genetic differences (A = 0.30 CI95 [− 0.01, 0.61], C = 0.41 [0.25, 0.56], E = 0.86 [0.79, 0.93]). At the item level, a well-
fitting genetically-informed model suggested 3 factors influencing generativity via a common-pathway structure. The first 
was tentatively characterized as reflecting a heritable general concern for the future. The second reflected being a valued 
source of advice and assistance. The third factor showed only unique environment effects and had as its strongest indicator 
having had a good influence on the lives of others. Replicability of this structure should be tested in the full version of the 
scale. Work is needed also to validate influences of generativity on vocations such as teaching and on philanthropic activity 
improving life for subsequent generations.
Introduction
“If I see further, it is by standing on the shoulders of 
giants” (Newton 1676)
“The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced.” (Carn-
egie 1889, p. 664)
The system of grants funded in the program represented 
in this special issue are focused on linking behaviour genet-
ics with philosophy via the concept of agency. The research 
topics are broad in scope: from novel models of moral 
agency (Curry et al. 2018) to the structure of traits charac-
teristic of high-agency individuals (Ryff 1989). In this paper, 
we focus on behaviors supporting future generations and 
the intergenerational enhancement of agency. Specifically, 
we examine “generativity”, defined as the desire to leave a 
positive legacy and accompanying activities that raise out-
comes for future generations (Erikson 1963; McAdams et al. 
1993). Sustaining the future has been identified as key to the 
welfare of future generations (Hauser et al. 2014) and legacy 
is an important motive for altruistic behavior (Zaval et al. 
2015), but individual differences have been less well studied.
No genetically informative studies of generativity have 
been reported. Therefore, to better understand the structure 
of generativity and its environmental and genetic influences, 
we conducted a twin study of generativity. We motivate the 
study with reference to the dependence of human agency 
on cumulated physical and mental cultural artifacts inher-
ited from the work of previous generations, and the norms 
necessary to promote such desire to leave a legacy, many 
of which are themselves cultural inventions (Hauser et al. 
2014). We then examine the conceptual origins of the idea 
of generativity as a prototypically human trait, followed by 
an analysis of the genetic and environmental structure of 
individual differences in generativity.
Kaja Faßbender and Annika Wiebe contributed equally to this 
work.
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Agency as a cultural and genetic inheritance
The level of agency experienced by each generation is in 
large part dependent-upon a physical and cultural inher-
itance created by previous generations (Deaton 2013). 
This resource is provided not only by parents (Belsky 
et al. 2018b), but also by neighborhoods and even coun-
try (Sampson 2017). These effects operate in such diverse 
realms as the assurance of freedom and rule of law (Sen 
1999), to uptake of education (Cowen 2011), and more 
abstract legacies such as science (Wootton 2015).
From the perspective of agency enhancement, the 
extremely large effects of these factors (Deaton 2013; 
Sampson 2017) raises the question: What mechanisms 
motivate individuals to engage in creating these legacies 
of infrastructure? The focus of the present paper is on the 
trait of generativity, identified by Erikson (1963) as key to 
behaviors involved in creating such a legacy.
Previous genetically-informed research on factors sup-
porting increased agency, as manifested in outcomes such 
as self-control, cognitive development and educational 
attainment has focused on family-level factors, often with 
socioeconomic status (SES) as an environmental modera-
tor (Tucker-Drob and Bates 2016; Turkheimer et al. 2003). 
Research capitalizing on advances in molecular genetics 
(Kong et al. 2018; Okbay et al. 2016) has further sup-
ported the family as a system for enhancing agency as 
reflected in offspring educational attainment (Bates et al. 
2018). Research has also, however, been extended to 
examine upward social mobility (Belsky et al. 2018b) and 
to identify effects of the macro environment such as neigh-
borhood on traits associated with agency, for instance obe-
sity, mental health, teen-pregnancy, and poor educational 
outcomes (Belsky et al. 2018a, b).
Beyond family: the effects of transmitted 
cognitive capital
As noted above many of the largest effects on individuals 
reflect effects of superordinate structures, with some of the 
largest effects existing at the level of between nation differ-
ences (Rindermann and Ceci 2009; Sampson 2017). Hunt 
(2012) termed these factors “Physical cognitive artifacts” 
(e.g. working sewerage and electrical systems, or comput-
ers and electronics) and “Mental cognitive artifacts” such 
as logic and formal systems of finance. Such are the bene-
fits of such physical and mental cultural infrastructure, that 
cognitive adaptations specifically to support their creation 
have been argued to be a key element of human genetic 
adaptation (Lumsden and Wilson 2005). In particular, the 
cumulative aspect of culture—the ability to solve problems 
so complex that the ultimate solution must build upon par-
tial solutions arrived at by peers—appears to be unique in 
humans (Dean et al. 2012).
Generativity as an innate and socially‑influenced 
trait
One way, then, that genetics and culture may impact agency 
in a given generation is by affecting the desire of individuals, 
rather than to consume whatever capital they have managed 
to build up, to instead invest this in a positive, agency-raising 
legacy, a motive captured in the quote from Andrew Carn-
egie leading this article, and reflected also in much of phi-
lanthropy. Broadly conceived, this motivation can be termed 
a generative urge. Erikson (1963) saw individuals as clearly 
motivated not only for their individual success and happi-
ness but, especially as they aged, to focus more on giving to 
the common good and leaving a legacy for others. He called 
this motive ‘‘concern in establishing and guiding the next 
generation’’ (Erikson 1963, p. 267). Erikson further viewed 
generativity as both an innate drive and as a culturally influ-
enced social norm Erikson (1963).
Erikson embedded his idea of generativity within his 
larger model of psychosocial development. Since then, how-
ever, the concept has developed independently of that struc-
ture. McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) developed both a 
variant of generativity theory and methods for measuring the 
construct. These authors surveyed descriptions of generativ-
ity, synthesizing these in a model including seven social and 
personal elements (see Fig. 1). In their framework, genera-
tivity exists as a multi-componential potential that is latent in 
an individual, emerging as a more important determinant of 
behaviour in adulthood in response to growing opportunities 
and pressures to express generativity.
In the McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) model, genera-
tive behaviour results from a combination of inner desire 
and cultural demand, as well as feedback from generative 
actions. These forces provide input to an interacting inter-
nal network comprised of concern, belief, and commitment. 
Jointly these three elements represent a person’s feelings, 
values, and thoughts regarding generativity. The relation of 
all these elements are suggested by McAdams to be able to 
enter awareness as a “generative narration”, which can, in 
turn, influence whether and how a person pursues the goal 
of improving future generations.
Measuring generativity
Earlier measures of generativity include self-ratings of sev-
eral Eriksonian stages (Ochse and Plug 1986; Carol and; 
Heincke 1983), and assessment of components of genera-
tivity such as dominance and innovation (Carol and Migdal 
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1984). McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) argued that these 
measures correlated too highly with other constructs and 
lacked external validity. Responding to this perceived need, 
the authors constructed the Loyola Generativity Scale 
(LGS) to assess individual differences in generative concern 
(McAdams and de St Aubin 1992, p. 1006). The scales build 
on both existing work and their own generativity model 
revolving around the personality tendencies of caring about 
future generations (Aubin and McAdams 1995) and wish-
ing the legacy of the self to live on (McAdams and de St 
Aubin 1992).
Behavioral correlates of generativity
The LGS shows positive correlations with generative actions 
and narrations (McAdams and de Aubin 1992; McAdams 
and Guo 2015) and predicts behaviors linked to generativ-
ity including social engagement (Cox et al. 2010; Rossi 
2001), authoritative parenting style and associated posi-
tive outcomes in offspring (Peterson 2006; Peterson et al. 
1997), a higher level of social support from family and 
friends, and higher levels of religious and political engage-
ment (Hart et al. 2001). Other research on the correlates of 
generativity has demonstrated links to well-being and life 
satisfaction (Ackerman et al. 2000; An and Cooney 2006; 
Aubin and McAdams 1995; Cox et al. 2010; Grossbaum and 
Bates 2002; Keyes and Ryff 1998; McAdams et al. 1993). 
While more work is needed to demonstrate if high levels 
of generativity affect, for instance, innovations improving 
social, political, or commercial life, and choices made which 
improve outcomes for future generations, it is fair to say that 
the LGS appears to be a valid measure according to evidence 
from multiple realms: from family and relationships to work 
and society and encompasses new creations that help future 
generations as well as direct guidance of future generations 
(McAdams 2013).
Regarding the developmental course of generativity, 
Einolf (2014) reported that generativity is relatively stable 
(> 0.60 over a 10-year period), but also that it attains near-
adult levels at least from the mid-20s onward, if anything 
showing a mid-life peak. Interestingly, marriage and child-
bearing were not associated with an increase in LGS scores, 
suggesting that this trait is, as theorized linked to a drive to 
support future generations more broadly rather than being a 
simple reflection or extension of family life (Einolf 2014).
Why a twin study of generativity?
Despite its relevance for the individual and the society, 
relatively little research has addressed the structure and ori-
gins of generativity, and none (that we are aware of) has 
examined the heritability of generativity. In review, we were 
asked why is a twin study still important? There are several 
reasons. Generativity theory claims a relatively strong influ-
ence of shared environment on generativity (Erikson 1963; 
McAdams and de Aubin (1992; McAdams and Guo 2015; 
Rossi 2001). This would make it unusual among most traits 
in adulthood, where shared environment (“C”) is usually 
modest in magnitude and relative to genetic effects (Tur-
kheimer 2000). For instance adult cognitive ability has been 
reported as showing near-zero levels of shared environmen-
tal influence in adults (Deary et al. 2006). The prediction 
from generativity theory of a substantial C cannot be falsi-
fied, however, by appeal to a common pattern—it must be 
tested. It is therefore important to test the prediction that 
shared environment will play a large role, perhaps com-
parable too, or even larger than that of genetic differences 
in generativity. There are also violations of this pattern in 
Fig. 1  The 7-component model 
of generativity (Adapted from 
McAdams and de Aubin 1992)
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other traits. A number of abnormal traits, for instance, show 
relatively high levels of shared environmental influence that 
endure into adulthood (Burt 2009). In addition, though less 
often studied by behavior geneticists, attitudes are emerg-
ing as a class of traits with relatively weak genetic influ-
ence. While genes appear to be responsible for stability in 
some attitudes (Lewis and Bates 2017), such measures often 
show equivocal evidence for genetic and shared environmen-
tal influences (Lewis and Bates 2011; Martin et al. 1986). 
Generativity, then, may show influences of genes that are 
uncharacteristically low compared, for instance to genetic 
influences on cognitive abilities (Engelhardt et al. 2015), 
along with uncharacteristically elevated levels of shared 
environmental influence in adulthood.
A widely accepted reason to document the magnitude 
of variance attributable to genetic, family-environment, and 
unshared environmental influences, not just in a given sam-
ple (which is of limited value), but in many samples. This 
impetuous flows from the finding that variance attributable 
to genes and environment can not only take on different val-
ues depending factors such as age or birth cohort (Briley 
et al. 2015), but may vary quantitatively and qualitatively 
across sex (Neale and Maes 1996), and can be moderated 
by family-level factors such as socioeconomic status (Tur-
kheimer et al. 2003) or by linked factors such parenting 
style—a classic example being the suppression of genetic 
influences on disinhibition by parental religiosity (Boomsma 
et al. 1999).
Understanding and incorporating these moderators such 
as culture, country, cohort into causal, mechanistic psycho-
logical theories requires, at least in the first instance, collect-
ing evidence for their existence and dozens of well-powered 
studies across representative levels of each factor to map 
the space with some modicum of precision. Currently large 
regions of the world have no substantial twin studies even 
of core traits such as cognitive ability—India, Africa, and 
China for instance—while many specific domains of behav-
ior or attitudes remain to be studied even once.
While a complete theory of behavior genetics should 
be able to explain why traits show the levels of genetic or 
shared environmental influence observed, we are not in a 
position to do this, in part because the data required (esti-
mates of genetic, and shared environmental variance at dif-
ferent levels of proposed moderators, in different societies, 
and at different ages, and across sexes) have not been col-
lected. It is of value, then, to collect data on generativity, 
and to establish whether it has high, relatively modest, or 
even low levels of heritability, not only to add to the rather 
sparse database of heritabilities in the domain of attitudes 
and motives, but to begin to document variation in these 
traits across cultures and times.
A further reason to examine generativity in a geneti-
cally informative sample is that in this, as in all areas of 
social science, concrete estimates of genetic influence not 
only to test theory that includes such influences, but also 
motivate other research to include controls for genetics. 
As was noted in a recent commentary, even longitudinal 
relationships of parent and offspring behavior are not 
evidence for effects of parental behavior (Sherlock and 
Zietsch 2018). Documenting genetic and familial influ-
ences are important factors influencing the design of stud-
ies in which genetics would otherwise confound the causal 
logic of developmental studies. At present, no estimate of 
heritability for generativity exists to provide such a con-
crete stimulus.
A final motivation for studying the item-level heritability 
of generativity is that the genetic and environmental homo-
geneity (or heterogeneity) of generativity items has not been 
examined. While the phenotypic null hypothesis (Loehlin 
and Martin 2013; Turkheimer et al. 2014) often holds, it 
is a null hypothesis. That is, we cannot state with certainty 
that a given measure will reveal genetic, shared and unique 
environmental structures identical to that of its phenotypic 
structure. Instead, it is possible for genetic and shared envi-
ronmental influences to diverge from the phenotypic factor 
structure qualitatively as well as quantitatively. As an exam-
ple, work on optimism–pessimism (Scheier et al. 1994) has 
often treated these as a single bi-polar dimension, even as 
just a reflection of emotional-stability (Sharpe et al. 2011). 
However, under genetic analysis, orthogonal genetic influ-
ences on optimism and on pessimism have been revealed, 
along with a complex family-environmental structure (and 
no genetic factors) linking optimism and pessimism to neu-
roticism (Bates 2015).
Related to this task of decomposing the phenotype, twin 
studies can test the neurobiological coherence of a construct. 
Kendler (2013) gives the humorous example of an imagi-
nary syndrome called “LLR”, comprised of left handedness, 
long nose and red hair. Diagnosis for LLR syndrome would 
appear to be familial and (modestly) heritable, perhaps lead-
ing to a claim that LLR reflects the action of a unitary bio-
logical system. The claim that LLR behaviors are biological, 
however clearly does not, in itself, warrant the coherence of 
the category at a biological level. A twin study of the three 
LLR “symptoms” would reveal that in fact these are geneti-
cally unrelated—that is that the genetic program responsible 
for the biology of each symptom of the supposed syndrome 
lies on segments of DNA which segregate independently. 
While molecular studies with a hundred thousand subjects 
are now powered to detect item-level structure and cross-
disorder and even cross-sample GWAS summary statistics 
(Grotzinger et al. 2018), twin studies provide a well-powered 
tool to undertake the same tasks of testing biological and 
environmental coherence (Kendler et al. 2013) and even 
direction of causation (Gillespie et al. 2012). There are 
several reasons, then to test the scale and item-structure of 
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generativity in a twin study. We next move to the aims and 
hypotheses of the present study.
The present study
Our aim in the present study was to test the behavior genetic 
structure of the generativity scale, capitalizing on twin data 
to distinguish influences of genes, and of shared and unique 
environments. The classic twin design decomposes variance 
into additive genetic effects (A), shared or common envi-
ronmental influences (C) shared by both twins, e.g. place of 
residence or neighborhood factors, and unique environment 
(E): environment influences which are not shared, e.g. their 
unique peer-group (Neale and Maes 1996).
In hypothesizing what structure of A, C, and E one 
should predict to account for generativity sum-scores, we 
were informed by Erikson’s own (1963) theoretical structure 
described as involving both innate and cultural influences. 
Existing data on parent-offspring correlations of around 0.4 
between parents’ and children’s generativity scores (Peterson 
2006) confound shared environment and genetic influences, 
but imply that one or both of these factors should show sig-
nificant effects. Rossi (2001) has also hypothesized that both 
genetics and parental socialization should influence genera-
tivity. Analyzing personality traits and parental characteris-
tics correlated with offspring generativity in the MIDUS he 
showed that the personality traits of agency and commun-
ion (which he took as strong predictors of adult generativ-
ity), had a heredity component of 42 and 46%, respectively, 
implying a role for genes in generativity, and assuming a role 
for shared environment.
Following McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) and Erik-
son (1963), we therefore predicted, that LGS scale-scores 
would show significant effects of both additive genetic and 
of shared environmental influences (as well, of course, as 
unique environmental effects, which include measurement 
error).
Item‑level factor structure
In terms of the item-level factor structure of the LGS (short), 
while the scale is designed to be unifactorial, we were open 
minded as to the factor structure that would be revealed in a 
genetic analysis. In particular, the multiple components and 
influences on generativity identified in modern generativity 
theory (Aubin and McAdams 1995; McAdams and de Aubin 
1992; McAdams and Guo 2015) and shown in Fig. 1 suggest 
multiple distinct elements, with distinct environmental and 
genetic influences (or even no genetic influence in the case 
of factors external to the family) may play a role in mani-
fested generativity. If the items of the scale differ in their 
genetic and environmental architecture, then an item-level 
analysis of the scale may be able to decompose these distinct 
influences.
Based on Ockham’s razor and also the previous factor-
analytic evidence, we predicted that a common pathway 
model (see Fig. 3 and analysis plan below) with a single 
common factor would account adequately for variance in 
the generativity items, again with significant genetic and 
shared environment input to this common factor. Because 
McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) identify multiple distinct 
causal elements underpinning generativity, we predicted that 
if multiple factors were required to fit the behavior genetic 
data, these would conform to causal roles from one or more 
of the modules of the 7-factor generativity theory—for 
instance cultural demand could raise variance in some or 
all aspects of generative action, presumably through either 
shared, or unshared environmental routes. Similarly, indi-
vidual differences in inner desire, concern for the future, 
trait levels of commitment, incorporation of cultural and 
self-originated commitment into beliefs might fall out as 
distinct factors. The ability of the common pathway anal-
ysis to model such multi-factorial structure (and the less 
constrained biometric or independent pathway model) is 
described below.
Data analysis plan
For the univariate analysis of generativity scale-scores, we 
used the classic ACE decomposition (Neale and Maes 1996), 
which permits the estimation of an additive genetic factor 
(A), either dominance (D) or shared environmental factor 
(C), and a third “E” factor accounting for unique environ-
ment variance (see Fig. 2). Readers should note that the clas-
sic twin model is predicated on testable assumptions such as 
equal environments across zygosity (Kendler et al. 1993) and 
assortative mating (Swagerman et al. 2017). Other aspects of 
the models, like all models, depend on appropriate model-
ling to avoid mis-allocating variance (Keller and Coventry 
2005; Turkheimer and Waldron 2000). Important among 
these are assumptions about the presence of unmodeled 
interactions. For this reason, we also undertook an exami-
nation of potential gene-environment and environment–envi-
ronment moderation of A, C, and E effects by factors such as 
socioeconomic status (Rowe 2001; Tucker-Drob and Bates 
2016; Turkheimer 2016). This was done using univariate 
interaction models specified in Purcell (2002).
For the multivariate item-level analyses, our plan included 
using a common pathway model and also independent path-
way models of the variance, representing different ways in 
which genes and environment might account for variance 
and covariance in these individual items, including allowing 
for multiple factors among measured items (Neale and Maes 
1996). A common pathway model (CPM) is shown in Fig. 3. 
This model assumes that gene and environmental factors 
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contribute to a latent psychometric factor, which then in turn 
is manifested in the measured variables. In other words, the 
genetic and environmental influences act on items via a 
common pathway, hence the name. In the second type of 
theoretical model used—the independent pathways model 
(IPM)—no common psychometric latent traits are postu-
lated. Instead, latent genes and environments factors act 
directly on each item, potentially having different effects 
on the pattern of item covariation. Both the CPM and IPM 
models can be extended to have more than one A, C, and E 
factor, thus modelling more complex patterns of covariance 
among the measured variables (Neale and Maes 1996). The 
CPM is subsumed within the IPM, and fit of the two models 
can therefore be compared using a likelihood ratio χ2 test.
Model fit and choice of a baseline model
Model fit can be statistically evaluated by means of a likeli-
hood comparison against a baseline model. For the univari-
ate model, the saturated model has no degrees of freedom 
and thus serves as its own baseline for tests, for instance, of 
the significance of individual paths. For multivariate mod-
els (in this case item-level models) the choice of a baseline 
model is more complex. While it is common practice to 
evaluate such models against a multivariate Cholesky ACE 
model, algebraically, this model is not unbiased (Carey 
2005). For this reason, we used instead the theoretically pref-
erable direct variance–covariance ACE model (see Fig. 4). 
As in the Cholesky model, the direct variance–covariance 
model decomposes the variance of each manifest variable 
into additive genetic (A), common environmental (C) and 
unique environmental (E) components. However, unlike 
the Cholesky model (which takes its name from its use of 
intermediate matrices comprising a Cholesky factor decom-
position of path coefficients which are post multiplied by 
their transpose to estimate the manifest variance covari-
ance matrix) the direct variance–covariance decomposition 
directly estimates the variance attributable to the A C and 
E variance components. This achieves a saturated and unbi-
ased model (Carey 2005; Verhulst et al. under review).
Methods
Participants
The data for this study originate from Wave II of the Mac-
Arthur Foundation Survey for Midlife Development in the 
US (MIDUS: Brim et al. 2004) containing data from 851 
twin pairs of a nationally representative sample of house-
holds. Our sample consists of 856 female (mean age 53.96 
years, age range 34–84, SD = 11.86) and 656 male (mean 
age 54.36 years, age range 34–82, SD = 11.37) twins where 
at least one twin in a pair had completed the generativity 
questionnaire. A total of 756 complete twin pairs were rep-
resented. Of these, 278 were monozygotic (153 female and 
125 male) and 478 dizygotic (175 were female, 103 male 
and 200 opposite sex).
Measures
The Loyala generativity scale‑short (LGS‑Short)
We used an abbreviated and modified version of the 20-item 
Loyala Generativity scale, developed for MIDUS (see 
Appendix 2). The short scale consists of 6 items (α = 0.85), 
some of which match items from the original scale, while 
others have been reworded in an attempt to cover multiple 
elements of generativity. The short scale has been reported 
as fitting a one factor structure (Einolf 2014). We confirmed 
this with a parallel analysis (Horn 1965) indicating clear 
support for a 1-factor solution, with only one factor show-
ing an adjusted eigenvalue greater than expected by chance 
(adjusted eigenvalue for factor 1 = 3.03). A maximum like-
lihood factor analysis indicated this factor accounted for 
50.5% of variance in the scale, with item loadings rang-
ing from 0.59 to 0.776. Items include statements like “Oth-
ers would say that you have made unique contributions to 
society” or “You like to teach things to people”. The scale 
showed acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.85).
Fig. 2  Univariate Cholesky decomposition. The model shows latent 
additive genetic (A), shared environment (C) and unique environment 
(E) influences, and their paths (a, c, and e) to the manifest (measured) 
trait “x” for twin 1 and twin 2 of each twin pair. Curved paths show 
the covariance of C (1.0 in both MZ and DZ groups) and how the 
covariance between A latents takes the value 1.0 in the MZ group, 
and 0.5 in DZ group. The means of the data are modelled via  b0 paths
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Despite considerable overlap, the long and short scales 
differ in a number of substantive ways. The items are 
written in the third-person, and all are positively worded, 
whereas in the full version, items are in the first-person 
tense and include negative items (e.g. “I have done nothing 
of worth to contribute to others”). The long scale is explic-
itly focused of effort and success at passing along knowl-
edge (e.g. “I have made a difference to many people”) 
where the short scale focusses on possessing such knowl-
edge or skills. The long scale also measures the enjoy-
ment of a vocation (such as being a teacher), as opposed to 
“liking to teach things to people” in the short scale. Some 
behaviors are absent, for instance volunteering for charity, 
creative effort, commitment, productivity, neighborhood 
responsibility. The full version also emphasizes the crea-
tion of a legacy that will be remembered beyond a person’s 
own lifetime.
Respondents rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (‘A lot’) to 4 (‘Not at all’).
Fig. 3  Example Common 
Pathway Model. “A”, “C”, and 
“E” are additive genetic, com-
mon environmental, and unique 
environmental latent factors, 
respectively. Latent “as”, “cs”, 
and “es” are additive genetic, 
common environmental, and 
unique environmental specific 
influences, respectively
Var 1 Var 2 Var 3 Var 4 Var n
CF1 CF2 CFn
A1 C1 E1
a1 c1 e1
A2 C2 E2 An Cn En
a2 c2 e2 an cn em
As1
Cs1
Es1
11111
1
1
1
Asn
Csn
Asn
1
1
1
cf11 cf21
1 1 1 1
…
cf31
as1
…
…
Var 1 Var 2 Var 3
1
a13
a12 a23
1 1
A2 A3A1
a11 a22 a33
Fig. 4  Baseline Direct variance–covariance ACE decomposition. For 
clarity, showing only Twin 1 variables and also omitting paths from 
the C and E matrices. Each measured item has its own genetic (and 
common environmental, and unique environmental latent factors). 
These have estimated variance (e.g.  a11) and can covary with the vari-
ance components for the other manifest variables. Variance of each 
manifest and covariances among these is thus estimated directly as 
the sum of A, C, and E influences
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Statistical analyses
Univariate twin modelling
To test the hypothesis that familial clustering in generativity 
is explained by both additive genetic and family environ-
ment factors (in addition to unique environmental influences 
including measurement error), we fitted univariate biometri-
cal genetic models (Neale and Cardon 1992). Based on the 
Classical Twin Design (Jinks and Fulker 1970; Neale and 
Cardon 1992), our univariate modelling used the expected 
genetic and environmental correlations between monozy-
gotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins to decompose indi-
vidual differences in generativity into additive (A) genetic, 
shared environmental (C), and non-shared or unique (E). We 
fitted twin models using the FIML (Full Information, Maxi-
mum Likelihood) capability of the OpenMx package (Neale 
et al. 2016) in R 3.5.1 (R Core Team 2017). Since MZ twin 
pairs are genetically identical and DZ twin pairs share, on 
average, half of their genes, the expected twin pair correla-
tions for additive genetic effects are 1.0 and 0.5 respectively. 
An important assumption is that the common environments 
(C) are equal in MZ and DZ twin pairs, and that assortative 
mating is negligible although this can also be modelled by 
fitting differing values for the DZ additive genetic correla-
tion (Loehlin et al. 2009). Because non-shared environments 
(E) are uncorrelated, E necessarily includes measurement 
error. All data were residualized for covariates of age and 
sex.
Multivariate twin modelling
To test the hypothesis that genetic factors in each of the gen-
erativity items reflect a single common continuum of liabil-
ity (and later to test the possibility that more than one factor 
is expressed), we again used the OpenMx package (Neale 
et al. 2016) and R (R Core Team 2017) to fit common- and 
independent-pathway models (Neale and Cardon 1992), 
beginning by fitting a single CPM to the 6 generativity 
items. Each model was tested by comparing its fit to that of a 
saturated variance-components model (Verhulst et al., under 
review). As illustrated in Fig. 3, the CPM assumes that there 
exist one or more common latent pathways to generativity, 
each of which reflects additive genetic (A), shared environ-
mental (C), and non-shared environmental (E) components. 
The figure shows how each common pathway is indicated 
by the manifest or observed phenotypic measures (genera-
tivity items). Variance unique to each item is decomposed 
into component-specific elements of variance: as; cs; and es.
We began by fitting a model with a single psychometric 
common pathway, with all parameters estimated. Follow-
ing this, we tested fit, and, as proved necessary, tested an 
IPM, as well as CP and IP models with 2 or 3 factors. We 
subsequently tested models in which all ‘C’ parameters were 
fixed to zero, and in which all ‘A’ factors were set zero. Fit 
was assessed using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC: 
Akaike 1974) which balances complexity against explana-
tory power. AIC differences among competing models were 
presented also in terms of AIC weight-based conditional 
probabilities to facilitate interpretation (Wagenmakers and 
Farrell 2004). These were computed using the R package 
MuMIn “Weights” function with model AICs as input.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the mean scores and standard deviations of 
each of the six generativity items as well as the correla-
tions (and SEs) for the MZ and DZ groups (one subject from 
each pair used) for each item. Mean levels suggested that 
most people are low to moderately concerned about the care 
and future of the next generation. At an item level, genera-
tivity was correlated weakly across the twins with modest 
Table 1  Mean scores and 
standard deviations, on the 
individual items, separately 
for twin1 and twin2 in each 
group [monozygotic (MZ) and 
dizygotic (DZ)] of twins, and 
the correlations between twin 
1 and twin 2 for each item, 
separately by group
MZ DZ Twin 1–twin 2 correla-
tion (SE)
T1 T2 T1 T2
M SD M SD M SD M SD MZ DZ
Item 1 2.51 0.92 2.55 0.95 2.45 0.91 2.48 0.88 0.20 (0.08) 0.19 (0.06)
Item 2 2.17 0.86 2.15 0.80 2.14 0.82 2.06 0.80 0.28 (0.07) 0.15 (0.06)
Item 3 2.30 0.86 2.23 0.76 2.25 0.81 2.23 0.78 0.29 (0.07) 0.16 (0.06)
Item 4 2.17 0.84 2.23 0.79 2.18 0.78 2.08 0.87 0.20 (0.08) 0.18 (0.06)
Item 5 2.04 0.85 2.08 0.78 2.08 0.78 2.01 0.82 0.10 (0.08) 0.13 (0.06)
Item 6 1.92 0.89 1.91 0.83 1.86 0.81 1.89 0.83 0.16 (0.08) 0.10 (0.06)
Scale mean 2.19 0.69 2.19 0.63 2.16 0.60 2.12 0.63 0.28 (0.07) 0.20 (0.06)
Average for single items 0.21 0.15
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increments in association for the MZ versus the DZ twin 
pairs. The DZ twin pair correlation was typically more than 
one-half of the MZ counterpart, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that familial clustering is significantly influenced 
by shared environment factors.
Univariate results
The standardized variance components for the full univariate 
model generativity scale-scores are shown in Fig. 5, and the 
fit statistics for models dropping C and dropping A from the 
model are presented in Table 2. AIC weight-based (Wagen-
makers and Farrell 2004) conditional probabilities for the 
ACE, CE and AE models respectively were: 0.20 0.50, and 
0.30, suggesting a slight preferability of a CE model over 
either the AE or ACE models. As both the AE and CE mod-
els provided equivocal fit to the data, we show the unreduced 
ACE model (see Fig. 5).
In the saturated model, additive genetic risk factors 
explained 8.8% of the total variation. Relative to many traits 
studied, this level of genetic influence is relatively small. 
Shared environmental factors accounted for approximately 
twice this proportion of variance in generativity (16%). 
The remaining proportion of variance was explained by 
non-shared or stochastic environmental risk factors includ-
ing measurement error.
In an exploratory modelling phase, we also ran a 
gene × environment interaction model (Purcell 2002) testing 
if gene or environment variance might be moderated by the 
childhood socioeconomic environment (SES) experienced 
by the subjects, as is the case for their attained cognitive 
ability (Bates et al. 2013). There was, however, no support 
for moderation by SES of A, C, or E variance and all three 
moderation paths could be removed without significant loss 
of fit (χ2 (3) = 1.61, p = 0.657) and an improvement of AIC 
compared to a model containing these paths (AIC = − 96.00 
versus − 91.6 including moderation).
Multivariate item‑level behavior genetic analyses
We next turned to the item-level data, to test our hypoth-
esis that, under behavior genetic analysis, the items of the 
scale would be well explained by a single common factor 
model with significant genetic (A) and shared environment 
(C) influences (as well as unique environment, E). To this 
end, we computed a 1-factor CPM, and compared this to the 
direct variance–covariance baseline model (see Table 3 for 
fit comparisons).
As can be seen in Table 3, a 1-factor CPM fit poorly com-
pared to the direct variance–covariance baseline model (χ2 
(37) = 136.77, p < 0.001). We then explored sequentially 
more-complex models. A 1-factor IPM also showed inad-
equate fit (p < 0.001). We then executed CPM and IPM mod-
els with 2 and 3 factors, finding that a 3-factor CPM model 
fit well (χ2 (21) = 9.85, p < 0.98, see Table 3). A 2 factor 
IPM also did not fit significantly worse than the baseline 
model (χ2 (9) = 13.99, p < 0.123) but was not preferred by 
AIC compared to the 3 common pathway model (AIC for the 
3-factor CPM = 584.05 versus 603.65 for the 2-factor IPM, 
see also Table 3). This complexity was unexpected.
Tentative model reduction
Given the modest power of the present study, we do not 
report an attempt to remove all non-significant paths, and 
instead report the full model with confidence intervals (see 
Fig. 6). We did evaluate the relative merit of 3-factor CPM 
Fig. 5  Univariate ACE analysis of Generativity scale-scores showing 
path coefficients (95% CIs in brackets). For clarity, decimal places not 
printed on parameter estimates
Table 2  Fit statistics for 
univariate ACE, CE and AE 
models of generativity scale-
scores
Lower AIC is better, p-value reflects the significance of dropping A or C from the ACE baseline model
Model EP Δ − 2LL Δ df p AIC Compare 
with 
model
1 ACE 4.00 − 102.00
3 CE 3.00 0.24 1 0.628 − 103.76 ACE
4 AE 3.00 1.27 1 0.259 − 102.73 ACE
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models in which all C influences (AE model) were dropped 
compared to a model in which all A influences (CE model). 
Neither model incurred a significant loss of fit (p = 0.999, 
see Table 3), indicating equivocal evidence for the source of 
familial clustering for generativity.
Discussion
The univariate results supported the hypothesis that genera-
tive concern is subject to substantial shared-environmen-
tal effects, such that in this dataset, evidence for C effects 
exceeded that for additive genetic influences, which were 
modest and smaller in magnitude. By contrast, our item-level 
hypothesis (that a 1-factor common pathway model would 
fit well) was disconfirmed. Instead, the analyses revealed 
a complex factor structure best accounted for in terms of 
three psychometric factors in a common pathway model. We 
discuss these two findings in more detail below.
A surprising result of genetic research has been that often 
(Plomin 2011), but not always (Bates 2015; Burt 2009), 
behavior genetic data indicated absence of significant shared 
environmental effects. Following McAdams and de St Aubin 
(1992) and Erikson (1963), we predicted that for generativ-
ity, parental socialization would play a role, and, therefore, 
that shared environment effects would be significant in these 
Table 3  Comparison of item-
level models of generativity: 
comparing 1, 2, and 3-common 
pathway (CP) and independent 
pathway (IP) models with the 
baseline (saturated variance–
covariance model)
The best-supported (according to AIC) un-reduced model (3-factor CP model) of generativity shown in 
bold
Model EP ∆ − 2LL ∆ df p-value AIC Compare with model
Baseline 69 607.67
1-factor CP 33 136.77 37 < 0.001 678.96 Baseline
2-factor CP 42 49.37 29 0.011 607.56 Baseline
3-factor CP 51 9.85 21 0.981 584.05 Baseline
1-factor IP 42 68.08 27 < 0.001 621.75 Baseline
2-factor IP 60 13.99 9 0. 123 603.65 Baseline
3-factor CP 51 4.42 12 0.974 584.05 2-factor IP
3-factor CP (no C) 42 2.10 9 0.999 568.18 3-factor CP
3-factor CP (no A) 42 3.25 9 0.999 569.33 3-factor CP
Fig. 6  Final 3-factor common pathway model of generativity. F1-F3 
are the three psychometric factors of the model. “A” “C” and “E” 
are common latent genetic shared- and unique-environmental influ-
ences respectively, and “as” “cs”, and “es” the corresponding specific 
influences (SE in brackets). For clarity, decimal places not printed on 
parameter estimates
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analyses. Shared-environment refers to all non-genetic fac-
tors that differentiate between families and make twins more 
similar to each other, for example socio-economic status of 
the family, the neighborhood they live in or parenting style 
(Neale and Maes 1996). This result, then, supports a role 
of environmental effects aggregating at the familial level. 
Unshared environmental effects were significantly larger 
again. This result is compatible with the role of differential 
exposure to cultural norms and systems which are supportive 
of positive attitudes toward the future and leaving a legacy to 
future generations via mechanisms discussed, for example, 
by Hauser et al. (2014) and Janssen et al. (2010) and related 
to producing social systems reinforcing and communicating 
norms regarding these attitudes.
The results also suggest that an expectation of zero C 
effects, for all behavior genetic traits, may be premature, 
not only because of GE covariance in different forms 
(Bates et al. 2018; Plomin 1994; Turkheimer and Waldron 
2000), but also for simply a lack of power to detect C rela-
tive to A (Neale and Maes 1996), ability to capitalize on 
aggressive dropping of blocks of paths masking significant 
effects within these large blocks, and inherent biases of the 
Cholesky model as a baseline against which to test sig-
nificance of the shared environment (Verhulst et al., under 
review).
Multivariate item‑level analyses
The analyses supported three independent common factors 
accounting for variance in the short LGS. This was interest-
ing both in virtue of the more complex structure compared to 
that seen in purely phenotypic analyses (Einolf 2014), and, 
of course, for the psychological meaning that may be attrib-
uted to these three factors. Divergence between phenotypic 
and behaviour genetic structure is uncommon—genetic stud-
ies mostly are not expected to uncover deeper structure (Tur-
kheimer 2016). As Loehlin and Martin (2013, p. 761) put it 
with respect to personality “the structure…is inherent in the 
evolved phenotype” rather than being organized by immedi-
ate genetic or environmental factors. The present findings 
diverge from this pattern, reflecting differential patterning 
among the items. The result supports the role for geneti-
cally informative samples in sub-typing distinctly segregat-
ing components of behavior, and for arriving at meaningful 
distinctions in the origins of these components in terms of 
their dependence on purely environmental effects, or combi-
nations of genetic and environmental forces. This approach 
has been successful in psychiatric genetics (Kendler et al. 
2013). For instance, behavior genetic decomposition of 
Autism symptoms indicates that this is not a unitary syn-
drome, but that a diagnosis likely reflects three independent 
diseases (Happe and Ronald 2008; Happe et al. 2006).
One potential explanation for the structure is that rather 
than measuring purely the “concern” component of McAd-
ams et al. (1993) 7-component model of generativity (see 
Fig. 1), the short scale captures additional aspects of this 
structure. We next turn to the meaning of the three factors 
which emerged, bearing in mind possible links to this larger 
framework.
Factor 1, loaded above 0.45 on all 6 items. It thus behaves 
as predicted for the “generative concern” component of 
McAdams et al. (1993) theory. This factor showed high 
levels of unique-environmental variance, and roughly equal 
influences of genes and shared environment. The highest 
loading item was having skills to pass on (0.81). Factor two 
showed strong loadings on only two items: being asked for 
advice and being needed by others. The third highest loading 
was liking to teach. Other loadings were, in this sample, non-
significant. This factor showed the highest influence of genes 
and negligible evidence of shared environment influence. 
Factor 3 was almost entirely reflective of unique environ-
ment variance. The strongest loading was “You have had a 
good influence on the lives of many people”. The next high-
est loading items were being needed by others and enjoying 
teaching. Reflecting unique environments, this factor may 
tap the cultural-demand component of McAdams’s model, 
or perhaps opportunities which generate outsized but unpre-
dictable increments in the ability to leave a positive legacy 
for an individual, somewhat analogous to the out-size influ-
ence of initially similar individuals ending up with very dif-
ferent outcomes in Pareto-type systems of reward.
If we take factor 1 as tapping internalized generative con-
cern, the environmental factor 3 as tapping the unique expe-
rience of environmental opportunity and cultural demand, 
then, within the 7-component model, a plausible, though 
speculative, candidate for factor 2 would be inner-desire, 
in keeping with reported pleasure directly in the acts of 
caring and teaching. The three distinct pathways emerging 
here, then, may reflect both general level of concern and two 
inputs to that concern: inner desire and exposure to cultural 
pressure.
Limitations and future study
The study has limitations. Given power of the present study 
to resolve competing models (for instance the 2 independent 
pathway and 3 factor common pathway models did not dif-
fer greatly according to AIC), it would be valuable to repeat 
the analyses with the full scale, and, preferably, in a larger 
sample. We are undertaking this task as part of the project 
this year.
It would be of value also to have measures for more of 
the 7 predicted components of generativity, work that would 
not require access to a twin sample. Given the importance 
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attributable to education in modern society, it would seem 
useful to understand better the origins of motivation to teach. 
Based on low rates of systematic teaching (as opposed to 
allowing children to watch skilled tasks, or practice these 
themselves) in pre-industrial society, Lancy (2016) suggests 
that while children are adapted to copy and learn, adults 
are not adapted to explicitly teach. The present data suggest 
at least some heritable influence on interest in teaching. It 
would be valuable to explore such motives in more depth.
The present sample was predominantly middle aged. It 
would be valuable to study generativity in younger subjects 
(to understand its developmental origins). Also of value 
would be to measure wider social effects of generativity on 
important prosocial activities such as institution founding 
and maintenance.
Summary
With these limitations, this study is the first step to under-
standing the genetic and environmental structure of gen-
erativity. It demonstrated that, at a scale level, generativity 
reflects large influences of the environment, including shared 
environment, while revealing a more complex structure at 
the item level.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Loyola generativity scale
 1. I try to pass along the knowledge I have gained through 
my experiences.
 2. I do not feel that other people need me.
 3. I think I would like the work of a teacher.
 4. I feel as though I have made a difference to many peo-
ple.
 5. I do not volunteer to work for a charity.
 6. I have made and created things that have had an impact 
on other people.
 7. I try to be creative in most things that I do.
 8. I think that I will be remembered for a long time after 
I die.
 9. I believe that society cannot be responsible for provid-
ing food and shelter for all homeless people.
 10. Others would say that I have made unique contribu-
tions to society.
 11. If I were unable to have children of my own, I would 
like to adopt children.
 12. I have important skills that I try to teach others.
 13. I feel that I have done nothing that will survive after I 
die.
 14. In general, my actions do not have a positive effect on 
other people.
 15. I feel as though I have done nothing of worth to con-
tribute to others.
 16. I have made many commitments to many different 
kinds of people, groups, and activities in my life.
 17. Other people say that I am a very productive person.
 18. I have a responsibility to improve the neighborhood in 
which I live.
 19. People come to me for advice.
 20. I feel as though my contributions will exist after I die.
Appendix 2: Reduced Loyola generativity scale 
(from MIDUS)
1. Others would say that you have made unique contribu-
tions to society.
2. You have important skills you can pass along to others.
3. Many people come to you for advice.
4. You feel that other people need you.
5. You have had a good influence on the lives of many 
people.
6. You like to teach things to people.
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